ties in these acts which call forth the approbation of the conscience. There are points started by this second question, the ultimate resolution of which seems to lie beyond human capacity, but it is possible, we think, to specify the qualities which must meet in virtuous action on the part of man.

The THIRD inquiry, or into the rule, is eminently the practical one. It falls to be alluded to in this treatise, merely that we may distinguish it from the others, and conversely point out its relation to them. The answer to the question will be found in the many practical treatises on the duty of man.

In regard to the FOURTH question, or the inquiry into the consequences that follow virtue and vice, it is of importance to separate it from all the others. It is indeed of vast moment to be able to distinguish between the qualities which, being in an action, render it virtuous, and the qualities of the effects that flow from it. The former of these is a property of the agent, but the latter is a property, not so much of the agent, as of the Divine government.

ILLUSTRATIVE NOTE (F.)—METHOD OP INQUIRY IN ETHICAL SCIENCE.

It may be proper to explain here once for all, that we profess to carry on the investigation of these topics in the spirit and after the manner of Lord Bacon. It is certain that this father of modern science meant his method to apply to the mental as well as the material sciences.—(Nov. Org., lib. i., Aph. 127.) In the one branch as in the other, there should be an orderly observation of facts, accompanied by analysis, or, as Bacon expresses, the "necessary exclusions" of things indifferent, and this followed up by a process of generalization in which we seize on the points of agreement. The only essential difference between the two lies in this, that in the one we take the senses, and in the other consciousness, as our informant. We know of no other way of constructing a scientific ethics than by commencing at least with an inductive investigation of the facts, with the view of determining the necessary laws of man's moral nature.

True it is, that in ethical inquiry we have finally to do, not with *quid est*, but with *quid oportet;* but how are we to determine the *quid oportet* but by a previous and careful examination of the *quid est*. At the very opening of such an investigation, a thousand false views present themselves, and how are they to be dis-

pelled but by an appeal to facts attested by consciousness *1* The theories as to the nature of virtue differ widely from each other, and how are they to be tested but by an inquiry into the nature of man ? The nature of moral principle is to be ascertained—if it can be ascertained—by an investigation of man's moral constitution.

It is all true, as will be urged in opposition to this inductive method of inquiry, that there are moral principles in man's nature prior to all experience. And this fact should, we acknowledge, keep us from appealing to experience, to authorize principles, which are rather fitted and intended to sanction experience. But this